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ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING,  
AND THE MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM 
 
Abstract: We compare market returns associated with firms’ creation of new units focused on 
e-business. Two aspects of organization design - governance and leadership - are considered 
with regard to exploitation- and exploration-oriented organization learning. We find that 
exploitation in governance (high centralization) is associated with a lower mean and variance 
in returns; that exploitation in leadership (appointment of outsiders) is associated with the 
same mean yet higher variance;  and, among units exhibiting both modes of learning, the 
variance of returns are not equal. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Scholars of organization studies, studying a variety of outcome measures and 
mechanisms at different levels of analysis, are in general agreement that organizational 
effectiveness depends in large measure on the demonstrated ability of the organization to 
maintain a balance between two distinct yet complementary modes of organizational 
learning known as exploration and exploitation (March, 1991, 1995; Levinthal and March, 
1993; Sorenson & Sorensen, 2001; Sorensen, 2002; Hunter, 2003). The former is 
characterized by the experimentation with new ideas, paradigms, technologies, strategies, 
and knowledge. The latter is characterized by the elaboration upon, the refinement and 
improvement of, existing capabilities, ideas, etc. And while researchers in the field of 
organization design and its impact on firm performance have yet to explicitly examine this 
theoretical distinction, our reading of the literature finds its broad outline discernable in the 
long-term concern of that literature on the performance impacts of organization design 
choices such as delegation of authority, leadership and governance, incentives, and internal 
processes on firm performance. We briefly examine each in turn. 
Organization structures may tend to lead to one type of learning, such as the use of 
decentralized, autonomous structures to encourage exploratory goals like innovation and 
new product development, and the use of centralized structures to achieve efficiency and 
economies of scale (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Hedberg et al, 1976).  Organization structures 
may also exhibit or seek to strike a “balance” between thee two modes of learning, e.g. by 
combining firm-wide incentives that encourage broad search and exploration with an active 
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hierarchy that provides stability or exploitation (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003) or via a switch 
between centralization and decentralization at various points in time (Siggelkow and 
Levinthal, 2003). Modular product and organization designs also enable both exploration and 
exploitation by decomposing complex systems into loosely coupled subsystems (Sanchez and 
Mahoney, 1996). 
 In franchise governance systems firms achieve the exploration/exploitation balance 
by maintaining a mixture of company-owned and entrepreneurial franchises (Sorenson and 
Sorensen, 2001). This is because company-owned franchises are more likely to focus on 
exploitation, whereas entrepreneurs managing franchise units tend to focus on exploration. 
In firms within a single governance structure, Vera and Crossan (2004) argue that leaders 
must achieve the balance themselves by performing roles involving both “transactional” (the 
institutionalization, reinforcement, and refinement of existing routines) and “transformative” 
(changing the existing strategy and routines) behaviors. Combining a focus on structure, 
process, and leadership, Benner and Tushman (2003) argue that ambidextrous organization 
designs achieve the balance by employing relatively autonomous subunits free to either 
explore or exploit with the required coordination managed at the senior executive level. 
Incentives also promote or are indicative of different types of learning.  A balanced 
approach may be achieved by combining decentralized decision making with a strong 
identification with top management goals (Child, 1984; Nagar, 2002).   Another approach is 
to rely on compensation schemes that reward company-wide performance (Harris and Raviv, 
2002) over both the short and long-term. 
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  Finally, there is a robust literature focused on the role of organizational processes and 
the two types of learning. Sitkin et al (1994) distinguish between Total Quality Management 
activities focused on control versus activities focused on learning. Firms pursue control and 
reliability while simultaneously developing new, innovation-enhancing competencies 
(Sutcliffe et al, 2000). Firms employ design elements to balance the need to search broadly 
for new possibilities in its environment as well as to stabilize around a good set of 
opportunities once discovered (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003). Firms may adapt over time by 
changing processes by “opening up” (exploitation generating exploration) or “focusing” 
(exploration encouraging exploitation) (Holmquist, 2004). 
 Most recent studies propose that successful organization designs achieve the required 
dual focus by some mixture of structures, processes, incentives, and leadership. A structure 
that encourages exploration, for example, is mitigated by incentives that foster exploitation. 
This contrasts with older studies of organization design that imply that consistent or “pure” 
designs are optimal. While organization design scholars believe that there is no one best way 
to organize, the optimal organization design is asserted to employ consistent design elements.  
 Contingency theory, for example, suggests that organizations that demonstrate a fit 
between their internal structural elements and contextual factors are more likely to succeed 
(Burton and Obel, 1998), and conversely when systems are poorly attuned to contextual 
requirements problems ensue. Similarly, configuration theory focuses on the 
interdependencies between elements of an organization design (Miller 1999). Ketchen et al 
(1997) find that organization performance is partially explained by its configuration, and that 
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internally consistent sets of firms perform better. “Configurations, at their most useful, 
represent common, thematically driven alignments of elements or dimensions.” (Miller, 
1999: p. 28). If we regard exploration and exploitation as configuration types then, we might 
question whether alignment is achieved by mixing exploration-encouraging and 
exploitation-encouraging elements or whether alignment is achieved by focusing solely on 
one or the other in a consistent or “pure” form. Rivkin and Siggelkow (2003), for example, 
find that their results “call into question the recommendation that firms pursue pure 
“consistent” configurations” (ibid, p. 309). 
 Given all of the above, it remains unclear whether a consistent organization design or 
configuration is one that consistently pursues exploration or exploitation, or is one where the 
balance is maintained through a mixture of the aforementioned mechanisms. After all, we 
believe that there are traps that encourage an excessive focus on either exploration or 
exploitation, at the expense of the other (Levinthal and March, 1993). And if there are 
“balanced” types that make sense, are they all the same? Are some balanced or mixed 
organization designs better than others? 
 We focus on the effects of alternative organization designs that promote exploration 
and/or exploitation in new e-commerce focused business units, specifically their governance 
(whether to establish a stand-alone subsidiary or a centralized department or division) and 
leadership (whether the venture will be lead by an outsider or insider). We develop four 
hypotheses and test them on a sample of 373 press releases describing the creation of 
dedicated business units focused on e-business during the years 1993-2002. We address the 
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consequences of design and governance choices on two dimensions of performance: the 
mean level and the variance (Jemison, 1987) of market returns. The results indicate that the 
market values “exploitative” and “exploratory” design choices differentially. First, market 
returns associated with centralized units have equal mean values and lower variance than 
decentralized units. Second, units led by insiders have similar means but higher variance 
than those led by outsiders. Finally, “pure” types, i.e. those that are either exploitative or 
exploratory have equal mean returns and higher variance than  “balanced” designs, i.e. those 
that mix elements of exploration and exploitation. One mixed type in particular, the 
combination of a decentralized unit with an inside appointment, is shown to have higher 
variance in returns that all three other combinations.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following section contains an 
overview of March’s (1991, 1995) theory of organizational learning. This overview draws on 
that found in Hunter (2003) and establishes the rationale for our attention to variance, rather 
than mean levels of performance. The third section contains our literature review and 
statement of four hypotheses. Following this is a section that describes our research methods. 
The fifth section contains a discussion of the results of our empirical tests of the four 
hypotheses. The paper ends with a discussion of the implications of our findings.  
 
 
 
 
8 
OVERVIEW OF EXPLORATION-EXPLOITATION THEORY 
March (1991, 1995) described two fundamentally distinct, yet complementary ways 
that organizations learn and, thereby, change their performance: exploration and 
exploitation. While there are many bases for differentiating between these two types of 
learning, three of the most important are their goals and objectives; the means by which each 
is accomplished; and their implications for firm performance, especially the time period over 
which that performance is realized.  Table 1, below, summarizes those differences.  The 
objective of exploration, according to the theory, is frequently the attainment of flexibility 
and the development of new knowledge and new means of solving problems that the 
organization faces (March 1991, p. 72; March 1995, p. 432).  Exploration is associated with 
and is accomplished by way of a host of activities which increase variation in organization 
processes, tasks, and functions. These include complex search, basic research, invention, 
innovation, risk-taking, relaxed control, and loose discipline (March 1991, p. 71; March 1995, 
p. 432).  
By contrast, the goals of exploitation are typically more objective and particular, i.e. 
they are intended to meet clearly-defined and short-term objectives and immediate targets; 
to improve short-run efficiency; to reduce slack; and to increase the reliability, accuracy, and 
precision of, and  control over core processes and activities (March 1995, p. 431). Learning of 
the exploitative variety is achieved by way of actions that emphasize the reduction of 
variation in organizational activities. These include standardization of procedures, heuristic 
problem solving, relatively tighter control and discipline, risk-aversion, the emulation of 
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successes (e.g. benchmarking and best practice adoption), institutionalization, systematic 
reason, and by acting in an “appropriate manner “(March 1995, p.  432) 
The effects of exploration and exploitation are realized in categorically-distinct 
changes in the performance distribution of the firm (March 1995, p. 432).  The benefits or 
returns to exploration are described as being more uncertain than those associated with 
exploitation (March 1991, p. 85). This uncertainty has both spatial and temporal aspects 
(March 1995, p. 432). The spatial component concerns the supposition that exploration 
produces outcomes that tend toward both tails of the historical performance distribution. 
Exploitation, however, is less likely to produce performance outcomes that deviate 
significantly from the historical levels (March 1995, p. 432). Temporally, returns to 
exploration, be they positive or negative, are more remote, i.e. they lie farther in the future 
than those associated with exploitation. This difference has important implications. March 
argues that survival, let alone sustained superior performance, requires that firms engage in 
“sufficient” exploitation to ensure the current viability of the organization while exploring 
“enough” to ensure its future viability (March 1991, p. 71, 72). What constitutes “sufficient” 
exploitation and “enough” exploration is in large part determined by the characteristics and 
demands of the external environment (Sorenson and Sorensen 2001; Sorensen 2002).   
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Table 1: Key Characteristics of Exploration and Exploitation1 
 
Characteristic Exploration Exploitation 
Core Features • Experimenting with new ideas, 
paradigms, technologies, strategies, 
and knowledge 
• Elaborating on existing ideas, paradigms, 
technologies, strategies, and knowledge. 
• Improving and refining existing 
capabilities, technologies, etc. 
 
Goals • (To find) new alternatives that 
improve old ones; Flexibility; New 
Knowledge 
• (To meet) Clearly-defined, short-term 
objectives and immediate targets; Short-
run efficiency and improvement; 
Legitimacy; Reduced costs; slack; 
Reliability 
 
Returns • Distant in Time; High Variance; 
Tails of performance distribution 
 
• Proximal in Time; Low Variance; Near 
historical mean of performance 
 
Means/Methods  
of Implementation 
• Searching for new ideas; Deviating 
from standards; Variation; 
Innovating; Inventing 
 
• Acting in an appropriate manner; 
Adopting standardized procedures; 
Assuming proper organizational form; 
Defining and measuring performance; 
Downsizing and Re-engineering; 
Emulating success; Pursuing legitimacy; 
Eliminating redundancies Tightening 
slack; Focusing effort; Routinizing; 
Specializing; Total quality management; 
Managing the capabilities of the 
organization; Tying competencies to 
produce joint products; Linking activities 
to performance measures 
 
Other 
Characteristics 
• Novel 
• Serendipitous 
• Risky 
 
• Choice 
• Risk-aversion 
• Sane (Sanity) 
 
Facilitators • Free Association; Loose Discipline; 
Madness; Play; Relaxed Control; 
(Stimulated by) Failure 
• Analysis; Close Attention; Control; 
Discipline; Execution; Focused 
Attention; Hard Work; 
Institutionalization; Precision; 
Production; Refined Detail; Repetition; 
Sharp Focus 
 
 
                                                 
1 As described in March (1991, 1995) and Levinthal and March (1993).  
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
We measure the impact of announcements of new e-commerce business units on 
firms’ stock prices, focusing on the choices the firms make in the governance and leadership 
of the new units. The efficient markets hypothesis holds that (1) stock prices incorporate all 
currently known information about firms’ future profit streams and are, thus, the net present 
value of those profits and (2) that that new information about organizational or 
environmental changes that affect firms’ future profit streams are rapidly reflected in stock 
price (Fama et al, 1969). Several empirical studies have demonstrated that firm performance, 
especially market value, is positively impacted by firm’s investments information technology, 
in general (Hunter, Kobelsky, and Richardson, forthcoming; Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 1995, 1996) 
and by the pursuit of e-commerce initiatives, in particular (Subramani & Walden, 2001). 
Thus, we expect the announcement of the creation of new e-commerce-focused 
organizational units to have a significant and positive effect on the market value of the firm, 
primarily because such announcements are indicative of companies’ enhanced net profit 
streams due to new market gains and/or operational efficiencies.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The announcement of a new electronic commerce focused business unit will 
have a positive cumulative abnormal return. 
 
Governance and Organization Learning 
Theories of the organization-environment relationship predict that as the external 
environment increases in complexity, organizations should and do increase the 
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differentiation of their internal structures (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Galbraith, 1973). One 
way in which this is achieved is through the creation of subsidiaries, strategic business units, 
or internal divisions whose missions are to address the new and specific source(s) of 
complexity. These theories also predict that as environmental uncertainty increases, 
organizations should and do decentralize decision-making authority and/or adopt 
organizational practices and designs that are more decentralized (Burton & Obel, 1998). Less 
autonomous business units may be expected to search locally by using knowledge that is 
closely related to their existing knowledge (e.g. Stuart and Podolny, 1996). Spin-outs and 
autonomous business units involve a conscious effort to employ more exploratory search 
processes that develop new organizational routines and knowledge (March, 1991; Miner, 
Bassoff, and Moorman, 2001). 
Strategic choice theories predict that the creation of more autonomous organizational 
units creates value for firms because the unit’s managers have greater latitude to pursue new 
market opportunities and thus will tend toward more purely profit-maximizing strategies. 
Christensen (1998) argues that because of customer preferences and existing resource 
allocation processes, firms pursuing radical innovation must create independent spinouts to 
be successful. Similarly Leifer (Leifer, et al, 2000) found that new businesses escape the 
inertia of existing businesses by creating radical innovation hubs and corporate venture units. 
Such units are not without their shortcomings, however. In particular, more autonomous 
groups make it more difficult for the main organization to monitor behavior, to use 
hierarchies, and/or to maintain a common culture.  
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Over-reliance on exploitation is thought to result in obsolescence. Certainly, there is a 
strong literature showing the difficulty firms have in responding to radical technological 
change because of a propensity to rely on exploiting current capabilities (Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986; Henderson and Clark, 1990). Consistent with this, previous studies provide 
uneven support for the notion that local search (exploitation) results in higher returns (Stuart 
and Podolny, 1996).  And even though in uncertain environments, more exploratory 
behavior is assumed to be more successful (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003), there is no clear 
indication of how much exploitation or exploration is too much.  
Thus, in the absence of any clear and specific guidance from the literature on this 
matter, we would have to expect that, all else equal, the creation of new e-commerce focused 
business units that are relatively more centralized have lower variance in performance 
compared to units given more autonomy, e.g. spin-outs and subsidiaries.  Accordingly, we 
hypothesize that:  
 
Hypothesis 2: σ CAR (Centralized) < σ CAR (Decentralized) 
 
 
 
Leadership and Organizational Learning 
 Several research traditions demonstrate that hiring an insider to lead the new unit 
captures or exploits existing capabilities and routines, while outsiders bring new capabilities 
and routines. The resource based view of the firm holds that insiders may be expected to 
bring known routines and knowledge to the new organizational unit, while outsiders 
represent the opportunity to acquire new capabilities (Barney, 1991). And work in 
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organizational demography shows that firms are likely to hire outsiders in times of change 
(Haveman, 1995).  If it is the case that at times of change, existing routines and 
organizational processes are less appropriate or efficient for the requirements of the new 
market opportunity (Sorensen, 2002), then it follows that higher variance in returns will be 
associated with the appointment of insiders who have more knowledge about the 
organization’s current capabilities but less knowledge about and experience with the 
requirements of the new market environment. Thus, we hypothesize that 
Hypothesis 3: σ CAR (outsider) < σ CAR (insider) 
 
 
Comparison of Pure and Balanced Cases 
 
While the previous hypotheses focused on exploration or exploitation alone, as 
reflected in the choice of governance and leadership, we next consider the effect of 
combining these choices in both “pure” or internally consistent and “mixed” organization 
designs.   
Recent work suggests that internally consistent organization designs drive short-term 
effectiveness at the expense of long-term viability (Benner and Tushman, 2003). At first 
blush, such findings could lead us to predict that internally consistent e-commerce focused 
business units, i.e. those that combine exploration (exploitation) in governance with 
exploration (exploitation) in leadership, would have superior performance to those which 
“mix” the two modes of learning across these two elements of organization design.  However, 
further examination reveals this to be a fairly naïve assumption in large part because it 
ignores the crucial distinction between exploration and exploration- the distinction between 
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activities which increase variance in organizational processes and, by extension, in firm 
performance (exploration) and those that decrease variance in those processes and, by 
extension, in firm performance.  
With that distinction clearly in mind, we are in the position of making more specific 
claims about the impacts on performance associated with “pure” or internally consistent 
designs. In Hypotheses 2 and 3 we argued that greater centralization of authority and the 
presence of an outsider were both indicative, in this context, of exploitation and would be 
associated with lower variance in performance than the exploratory design choices. From 
these two hypotheses, two more hypotheses concerning internally consistent designs would 
seem to naturally follow. The first is that new, ecommerce business units that involve both 
types of exploitation, i.e. that combine centralization with a leader from the outside, will 
have lower variance in performance than either internally consistent exploration or either of 
the mixed types. Expressed formally, we have  
(1) σ Internally Consistent Exploitation < σ Internally Consistent Exploration and σ Mixed 
In addition, we could also argue from the same premises that firms whose units combine the 
exploratory design choices, i.e. insiders with decentralization, have higher variance than the 
three other design options. In a fashion similar to Eq. (1) above, we express this relationship 
below: 
 
(2) σ Internally Consistent Exploration > σ Internally Consistent Exploitation and σ Mixed  
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The combination of these two equations give us our fourth hypothesis- that exploitation in 
both elements of design are associated with lower variance in organizational performance 
while exploration in both elements is associated with greater variance. Expressed formally 
we have our fourth and final hypothesis: 
H4: σ Internally Consistent Exploration > σ Mixed > σ Internally Consistent Exploitation  
If it is indeed the case that internally-consistent designs occupy opposite ends of a 
performance continuum whose center is occupied by mixed types, we are perhaps amiss if 
we fail to theorize about their impacts on performance relative to one another.  
A key assumption of the contingency approach to organization design is that none of 
the different types of organizational structures are inherently better any of the others. 
Rather, the state of the external environment is an important determinant of the 
appropriateness of one organization form over the other (Burton & Obel, 1998), that is, 
which design will lead to better firm performance.  The relationship between environment, 
organization design, and performance has its analog in the strategy literature, as well. For 
example, Sorensen (2002) found that organizations with more balanced levels of 
organizational learning exhibited lower reliability in firm performance, i.e. higher variance, 
in stable environments and more reliable, i.e. less variable, performance in  more volatile 
environments.  
Because we consider the period of the introduction and commercialization of the 
internet and the emergence of the market for e-commerce related goods and services to be 
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one of high environmental volatility, as opposed to stability, it would follow that we would 
expect to find less variance in performance among newly created, e-commerce focused 
business units which mix the two modes of learning than in those that don’t mix them. 
However, an important shortcoming exists with this argument as well. First of all it does not 
help us distinguish between the performance of mixed modes, in general, and the two types 
of internally consistent designs. Secondly, it does not answer the matter of whether there are 
important differences between the two types of mixed designs. This second point has not 
been lost on organizational theorists of late.  
Some scholars argue for organization designs that are “ambidextrous” by creating 
efficient, exploitative subunits that coexist with relatively autonomous exploratory subunits 
(Benner and Tushman, 2003). Similarly, other recent studies have shown that organization 
performance can be enhanced when there is a balance via governance mechanisms (Sorenson 
and Sorensen, 2001) or a mix of internal mechanisms (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003). Such 
findings, combined with the intuitive observation that there are many ways in which this 
balance can be achieved, lead us to the conclusion that all mixed types are not necessarily 
created equal or, more importantly do not have the equal impacts on performance. As such, 
it behooves us to consider more closely whether in the case of the creation of new, e-
commerce focused units during a period of high environmental volatility, one of the mixed 
forms might be superior to the other.  
In short, distinguishing between the two mixed options, between the two types of 
designs that occupy the middle ground of our performance continuum, involves determining 
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whether in this context the governance decision dominates the leadership decision, or vice 
versa. In other words, it comes down to a determination of the relative importance of the 
centralization/decentralization choice and the outsider/insider choice. This relationship is 
perhaps best understood when rendered as Equation 3 below, i.e. as a performance 
continuum, the right end of which signifies lower variance in performance. 
 
(3) σ Pure: Decent + Insider > σ Mixed: Decent + Outsider > σ Mixed: Cent + Insider > σ Pure: Cent + Outsider 
 
The right end, we hypothesized earlier, is the domain of newly-formed, ecommerce-focused 
units that are purely exploitative, i.e. centralized and lead by an outsider. The left end of the 
spectrum signifies higher variance in performance and is the domain of units that purely 
exploratory, i.e. decentralized and led by insiders.  If the second position, moving from left to 
right, is occupied by the mixed type which features decentralization and an outside leader, 
then we can readily recognize that the “high variance” end of the spectrum is inhabited by 
decentralized units. That is to say, the two designs with the highest variance are the 
decentralized ones. Conversely, this means that the right or lower-variance end of the 
spectrum is where we find the centralized organizations. Such a state of affairs where high 
variance is associated with decentralization and lower variance with centralization is one in 
which the governance decision can be said to dominate the leadership decision: if high 
variance is the goal, pick decentralization and then adjust that level by who is picked to lead.  
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Equation 4, below, depicts a different state of affairs to that portrayed in Equation 3, 
shown above: 
 
(4) σ Pure: Decent + Insider > σ Mixed: Cent + Insider > σ Mixed: Decent + Outsider > σ Pure: Cent + Outsider 
 
Here, the end points of the spectrum are the same but the middle positions have switched 
places and the mixed type characterized by centralization and an insider is in the second 
highest variance slot while the decentralized, outsider-led unit is the nearer to the low-
variance end. In this set of relationships, higher variance is associated with the selection of 
an insider while lower variance is associated with selection of outsiders. Here, it would be 
the case that the governance decision is dominated by the leadership decision: obtain higher 
(lower) variance by choosing an insider (outsider) and then adjust that level by the choice of 
whether to have the unit centralized or decentralized. 
By our estimation, the literature does not provide strong priors on how to determine 
whether Equation 3 or 4 is the more accurate depiction of the middle ground between the 
two pure types. There is ample literature linking leadership and governance to organizational 
performance and effectiveness in times of high volatility. Rather than attempt to adjudicate 
between these two positions, a task whose difficulty is compounded by the fact of the 
uniqueness of the time period and phenomenon in which this study take place, we instead 
opt to articulate two competing hypotheses and to allow the data to resolve the matter. 
In summary, if the environment is one that requires that firms superior value on 
higher levels of organizational control to monitor the success of the new venture than on the 
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need to acquire from outside the skills and capabilities to run it, then it can be said that the 
centralization question dominates leadership and, thus: 
H5a: σ Pure: Decent + Insider > σ Mixed: Decent + Outsider > σ Mixed: Cent + Insider > σ Pure: Cent + Outsider 
   
If, however, the environment necessitates that a firm’s need for an outsider who possesses 
skills and capabilities to lead the unit is greater than its need to control and monitor the new 
venture, then our prediction would be that 
H5b: σ Pure: Decent + Insider > σ Mixed: Cent + Insider > σ Mixed: Decent + Outsider > σ Pure: Cent + Outsider 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
Press releases obtained from two newswires – PR Newswire and Business Wire- form 
the primary data for this study. Press releases were gathered through a systematic search of 
the Dow Jones Interactive® press release database for the years 1993-2002, inclusive. Our 
search term contained two groups of keywords: (1) organization design, e.g. terms like 
division, subsidiary, group, department, and unit and (2) internet, e.g. terms like e-
business/commerce, electronic business/commerce, internet, web, online, multimedia, 
digital, new media, and interactive 
Because of the potentially large number of articles that could contain these keywords, 
the search term limited press releases to those containing at least one keyword from each 
group in its headline or lead paragraph. After the press releases were collected and organized, 
three rounds of screening followed. The first round had the objective of screening for 
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relevance: ensuring that the collected press releases did in fact describe the creation, by an 
established business, of a new organization dedicated to conducting e-business, broadly 
defined. Thus, press releases about the formation or IPO of a new company were excluded, as 
were new companies created via, merger, acquisition, buy-out. Also excluded were instances 
of relatively larger firms taking major equity stakes in smaller, e-business focused start-ups.  
Following McWilliams & Seigel (1997), the second round of screening involved 
eliminating press releases which were confounded by the contemporaneous announcements 
events such as: reports of sales and/or earnings, the appointment of C-level executives; all 
manner of legal matters, e.g. the disposition of lawsuits or other litigation; new product 
launches unrelated to the newly-founded business units; and mergers with, acquisitions of, 
or investments in/by other firms.  
The third round of screening involved removing all firms from the sample which had 
not been actively traded for at least a full year prior to the date of the announcement or 
which had otherwise incomplete stock returns data. What remained, then, at the completion 
of these three rounds was 373 press releases by 323 firms operating 108 different 4-digit SIC 
Codes. 
After screening was completed, content analysis ensued. Each press was read and 
coded for the presence of two pieces of information: (1) whether or not the announcement 
described the creation of a largely autonomous organizational unit and (2) whether or not 
the announcement stated that the person appointed to lead the unit was a current employee 
or was recently hired from another organization. In all, two rounds of content analysis were 
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required to reach complete agreement among the authors as to the value of each variable for 
each announcement. Here are two typical examples of the kinds of statements appearing in 
the press releases which we used to determine the governance and leadership variables: 
• Creation of a Decentralized Unit: DAOU Systems, Inc. today announced that it has 
formed a new eBusiness subsidiary, named Enosus(TM), Inc., to provide end-to-end 
Internet professional services and solutions to health care and other commercial 
organizations executing an eBusiness strategy. 
 
• Appointment of Outsider(s): To support the continued growth of the Internet 
division and build new initiatives, VersaTel has also recruited four key senior 
executives with over 20 years of combined Internet experience, most recently at MCI 
Worldcom's Internet subsidiary, UUNet. 
 
Event Study Methodology 
 
The dependent variable employed in this study was the equally-weighted, market 
model, cumulative abnormal return over a three trading-day event window: the trading day 
immediately prior to, the trading of, and the trading day which followed the firm’s 
announcement of its intent to restructure for participation in electronic-commerce related 
markets and activities.  
 As has been well-documented, the event study methodology measures the reaction of 
investors to new information which has the potential to affect the earnings of certain 
publicly traded firms (Fama, et al 1969; Brown and Warner, 1985). This new information 
typically, though not always, comes in the form of news reports issued by or on behalf of 
these companies. The event study methodology is grounded in the efficient market 
hypothesis, i.e. that new information about a firm’s activities which can materially affect its 
current and future earnings is evaluated by investors and rapidly reflected in changes to the 
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firm’s stock price (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). That the information is “new” means that it 
was unexpected, i.e. unknown to or unanticipated, by investors at the time it was released. 
Under these assumptions, the abnormal returns associated with a firm’s stock which follow 
the release or discovery of new information are taken to represent the capital markets’ 
estimate of the net present value of the change in future earnings streams attributable to the 
new information.  
In this study we employ the market model, i.e. one which posits a linear relationship 
between the return of any stock to the return of a market portfolio (Fama, et al 1969). The 
market portfolio is used to predict a “normal” return during an event window.  The abnormal 
return is defined as the difference between the actual return and the predicted or “normal” 
return. The event window in this study is defined as the three-day period extending from the 
trading day prior to the announcement date through first trading day after it. 
Market model returns for all firms in this study were obtained by using the Eventus ® 
event study software via the Wharton Research Data Services website. Eventus performs 
event studies with data contained in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) stock 
databases. Eventus output includes both the cumulative abnormal return (CAR), as well as 
the CAR standardized by firm, over any user-defined event window. Because we are mostly 
concerned with how returns differ across design options and not just whether they are 
significantly positive or negative, we undertake a cross-sectional analysis of these returns, via 
multiple regression analysis. Doing so affords us the ability to explicitly control for 
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determinants of the abnormal returns, something that simple tests of significance would not 
allow.  
And since our hypotheses concern both the expected value and variance of returns, 
we employ Multiplicative Heteroscedastic (MH) regression, also known as variance 
decomposition (Weesie, 1998; Greene, 2003). MH regression allows simultaneous estimation 
of both the expected value and the variance of the dependent variable using maximum 
likelihood methods, something that ordinary least squares (OLS) regression does not permit. 
MH regression extends the standard linear regression of the expected value of a dependent 
variable to include a log-linear model of the heteroscedasticity in the dependent variable 
relative to each independent variable. Thus, like OLS, an MH regression assesses the impact 
of an independent variable on the expected value of the dependent variable. Unlike OLS, it 
also assesses whether the data points move closer to or further from the regression line as the 
independent variable changes. MH regression has seen use in several studies of the impact of 
organizational learning on firm performance (e.g. Sorenson & Sorensen, 2001; Sorensen, 
2002; Hunter, 2003). 
Tables 1 and 2, below contains descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of 
several potential predictors of the cross-sectional variance in cumulative abnormal returns. 
That none of the five (5) firm-level variables – announcement year; log of sales, quick ratio, 
capital intensity, and yearly close price- were significantly correlated with abnormal returns 
is consistent with the strong form of the efficient market hypothesis which states that all 
public information is already calculated into the stock’s price and, hence, not predictive of 
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abnormal returns. As such, cross-sectional analysis includes only industry fixed effects as 
controls. 
Insert Table 1 about Here 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
The first hypothesis, which posited that the three-day CAR associated with the 
creation of the organizational units in question would be positive, is strongly supported. The 
CAR for the 373 events averaged 2.22% (z = 5.76, p < 0.0001, 1-tailed test). The ratio of 
positive to negative returns was 203:170 and is highly significant (z = 3.26, p < 0.001, 1-tailed 
generalized sign test). Figure 1, below, provides the average returns for all 373 events over a 
period extending 30 trading days prior to and 30 days following the events’ announcement 
dates (day 0). Several things about this graph are noteworthy. First of all, while there is 
clearly a build up in the mean CAR in the trading days leading up the event announcement, 
the two day with the highest-absolute values and statistical significance are days -1 (CAR = 
0.90%, z = 3.57), and 0 (CAR = 1.70%, z = 6.55) i.e. the trading just prior to and the trading 
prior to the announcement of the creation of the organizational unit. This suggests that the 
market were indeed responding, and positively so, to the announcements and to the new 
information contained therein.  
Secondly, returns in the 29 trading days before the event window were significantly 
higher than those in the 29 days which followed (p < 0.005, 2-tailed test). A significantly 
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higher and rising pattern of returns prior to an announcement seems to indicate that the 
event may have been partially anticipated. 
Insert Figure 1 about Here 
 
Table 2, below, contains the results of the MH regression analyses conducted in the 
test of hypotheses 2-5, respectively. In the first equation the dependent variable, 3-day 
standardized cumulative abnormal returns, is an industry and year fixed effects model. That 
is to say, it includes a total of 14 categorical variables used as dependent variables. Eight of 
these dummy variables are for each of the eight years 1995-2002. Events announced prior to 
1995 serve as the comparison group. Six additional dummy variables were also specified, one 
for each of the first seven, 1-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) codes represented in 
the data set, with a seventh SIC code serving as the comparison group. The model uses 28 
degrees of freedom because the fourteen variables appear in both the mean and the variance 
estimation portions of the MH regression model. The chi-square for this baseline model 
equals 48.8, which for 28 degrees of freedom is significant at the p < 0.01 level.  
Model 2, which pertains to hypotheses 2 and 3, adds the governance and leadership 
variables. These results suggest strong support for the second hypothesis which proposed that 
the creation of relatively more centralized business units would be associated with lower 
variance in abnormal returns (γ = -0.656, z = -4.05, p < 0.001, 1-sided test).  
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Similarly, we also find strong support for Hypothesis 3 which proposed that the 
choice of an “outsider” would also associated be with lower variance (γ = -0.853, z = -4.34, p < 
0.001).  
Recall that H4 concerned whether pure exploration and pure exploitation occupied 
opposite ends of the performance variance continuum- exploration the higher end and 
exploitation the lower. In our models, this hypothesis is confirmed if it can be shown that 
two conditions are met- that the coefficient on the pure exploration variable is positive and 
significant and the pure exploitation variable is negative and significant when mixed types 
are used as the comparison group.  
As shown in Model 3 of the Table 2, the results are strongly supportive of this 
hypothesis. As we expected, the coefficient on the pure exploration variable is positive and 
highly significant (γ = 0.554, z = 3.24, p < 0.001, one-sided test2). Also as we expected, the 
coefficient on the pure exploitation variable is negative and highly significant (γ = -1.160,  z = 
-4.65, p < 0.001).  
Recall that Hypotheses 5a and 5b concern the question of which positions on the 
performance variance continuum are occupied by the two mixed types. The former posited 
that the decentralized-outsider combination would have higher variance while the latter 
posited that centralized, outsider-led organizations would have higher variance.  
As can be observed from Models 4 and 5 of Table 2, it is clear that H5a is supported. 
The coefficients in Model 4, where pure exploitation business units, i.e. centralized and 
                                                 
2 All results are 1-sided test unless stated otherwise. 
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outsider-led, are the comparison group, the coefficients on the three other combinations are 
positive and significant. More importantly, the coefficient for the decentralized, outsider-led 
mixed type (γ = 1.211, z = 3.19, p < 0.001) is larger than the coefficient for the other mixed 
type ( γ = 1.156 ,z = 4.59, p < 0.001). Model 5 of Table 2 also supports H5a, although it does so 
from the opposite direction. Here we have the pure exploration organizations as the 
comparison group. The coefficients on the other three types are negative, significant, and 
most importantly in the same relative positions. The coefficient on the decentralized, 
outsider-led organization variable is significantly lower than the comparison group, though 
only marginally so, indicating that it has less variance (γ = -0.509, z = 1.54, p < 0.10). The 
other mixed type, centralized and insider-led, has even more significantly lower variance in 
its returns (γ = -0.565, z = -3.22, p < 0.001). Taken together then, these two models make 
clear that the high end of the variance continuum is occupied by the two decentralized 
combinations- decentralized with insiders (pure exploration) has the most variance and 
decentralized with outsiders has the second highest. This suggests that the decentralization 
choice dominates the leadership choice even though both are significant individually and in 
their own right.  
 
Insert Table 2 about Here 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
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Based on cumulative abnormal stock returns over a three day trading window (H1), 
we find strong evidence that the market positively valued firm’s creation of new business 
units directed at providing ecommerce-related goods and services. Also, as expected (H2), 
governance elements focused on exploitation (centralization) had lower variance than those 
focused on exploration (decentralization). We also find that, as expected, hiring outsiders, 
those presumably possessing more information about and experience with the demands of 
the new market environment, resulted in lower variance (H3). We also find that the impact 
on performance of internally-consistent combinations of these two modes of learning is 
similar to what is observed with regard to their individual impacts. In particular, we observe 
that internally-consistent exploitation to be associated with the lowest variance in abnormal 
returns and internally-consistent exploration to be associated with the highest (H4). Finally, 
we explain, post-hoc, the governance choice explains the relative placement of the 
internally-inconsistent design options on the performance continuum. The highest and the 
second highest variance values of the four design options are characterized by 
decentralization while the lowest and second lowest variance values are found among the 
centralized units. This suggests to us that the crucial or dominant design consideration is the 
one of the delegation of authority.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
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The need for “balance” between the goals of exploration and exploitation is a key 
concept in contemporary organization studies. However, the specific mechanisms and 
limiting conditions are not as well understood or articulated. From an organization design 
perspective, recent work suggests that a balanced configuration of design elements will lead 
to improved performance. Our results indicate understanding this question requires careful 
consideration of what is meant by both “balance” and by performance. The findings of our 
fourth and fifth hypotheses speak directly to the importance of this issue. Recall that these 
hypotheses concern the differences in performance among the four design choices. One of 
the findings associated with these hypotheses, the one that revealed significantly lower 
variance in returns for the centralized, outsider-lead unit, is especially illustrative of why we 
need clarity in our terminology the finding. From our reading of the press accounts and the 
theory, this finding may be explained from the nature of the task that the leaders were asked 
to perform. E-commerce represented a new endeavor for many, if not most, of the firms 
launching these new businesses. In many cases the outsider hired to lead the effort was 
someone with experience in e-commerce from other firms. Indeed, “recent knowledge can 
enhance a firm’s ability to expand to new technological areas” (Katila, 2002: 995). But had it 
not been for our focus on the variance in performance, rather than its mean, we would not 
only would have had inconclusive results (there were after all, no mean differences in any of 
our hypothesis tests, only differences in variance) we would not have ever seen the link 
between these design choices and performance in a volatile environment. That link, as we 
see it, is that both greater centralization and an experienced outsider, are means for reducing 
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or moderating the variance in performance that inevitably results from the creation of a new 
business unit, especially in a highly volatile environment.  
Perhaps this result should not be surprising. While the decision to hire a high-
potential outsider and then constrain their activities by keeping the unit closely controlled 
by senior management does not, a priori, seem like a better option, it may be the case that 
tighter organizational control enhances the degree to which the new capabilities brought in 
by the outsider can be diffused throughout the organization. Put another way, centralization 
of an outsider-led new business unit may facilitate the transfer of new skills to the rest of the 
organization so that in time, they can become old and well-known skills rather than the 
knowledge remaining the province of one business unit or division.  
What these results demonstrate is that although there is no one best way to organize, 
there are differential returns to different approaches. If the desire is to seek the highest 
returns and there is a willingness to also bear the associated high variance, then the market 
believes that centralized governance, coupled with outsider leadership, represents a 
preferred approach and that centralized governance with an insider is the second best 
approach, probably because again, centralization is a more efficient means of the knowledge 
diffusion which is vital to organization learning of either variety.  
Finally, let us again underscore that this paper investigates the question of  balance in 
organization design in what we believe is a novel manner. First of all we use a measure of 
performance not typically considered by organization design theorists- the market reaction 
to firm’s announcement of new business units focused on e-commerce. We find considerable 
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variation in that measure – a fact which on its face indicates that all such announcements 
were not greeted with the same degree of enthusiasm. Perhaps the most novel aspect of our 
approach is our attention on the variance in our chosen measure of firm performance rather 
than the mean. The decision to focus on variance stems directly from our reading of March’s 
theory of organizational learning, a theory which we believe is, at its core, a theory about the 
relationship between firm performance and actions taken by the firm to increase and/or 
reduce variation in the organizational processes that underlie firm performance. In light of 
our reading of the theory and its application in this study, we come to see some of the extant 
literature on organization design and firm performance in a new light. In particular, we now 
see that it is possible to see organization design choices, e.g. the choice between a 
centralization and decentralization as choices between the need or desire of a firm to 
decrease or increase variation in the organizational processes, either of which can contribute 
to a higher mean level of firm performance, albeit by different means. 
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Figure 1  Mean Abnormal Returns for all 373 Events Beginning 30 Trading Days Prior to the Announcement 
Date and Extending for 30 Days Afterwards 
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Table 1  Descriptive Statistics & Correlation Matrix 
 
  Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(1)    Cumulative Abnormal  
        Returns 
2.21 10.47 ---        
(2) Standardized Cumulative 
        Abnormal Returns 
.29 1.33 .854***        
(3)   Centralized .63 .48 -.049 -.091#       
(4)   Insider .83 .37 -.001 .001 .000      
(5)   Log (Sales) 2.61 1.24 -.062 -.057 .001 .124*     
(6)   Log (Quick Ratio) .16 .36 .145* .174** .066 -.027 -.315***    
(7)   Log (Capital Intensity) .30 .30 -.052 .041 .039 -.019 -.278*** .290***   
(8)   Log (Yearly Close Price) 1.16 .59 .019 .025 -.035 .022 .643*** .115# .057  
(9)  Year of Announcement 1998.4 1.88 -.013 -.022 -.086 -.017 -.019 -.129* .030 -.238*** 
 
Legend: # p < 0.10,   * p < 0.05,   ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001, All two-sided tests 
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Table 2 Multiplicative Heteroscedastic Regression of Learning-Related Independent 
Variables on Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
(H2, H3) 
Model 3 
(H4) 
Model 4 
(H5a) 
Model 5 
(H5b) 
MEAN PANEL      
Governance = Centralized 
  
-0.172 
(-1.20)  
  
Leadership = Outsider 
  
0.022 
(0.18)  
  
Pure Type: Exploration = 
 (Decentralized + Insider)   
0.148 
(0.91) 
0.144 
(0.178) 
 
Mixed Type: (Decent + Outsider) 
    
0.157 
(0.57) 
0.013 
(0.04) 
Mixed Type: (Cent + Insider) 
    
-0.034 
(-0.26) 
-0.178 
(-1.08) 
 Pure Type: Exploitation = 
 (Centralized + Outsider)   
0.014 
(0.11) 
 -0.144 
(-0.78) 
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
VARIANCE PANEL      
Governance = Centralized 
  
-0.656*** 
(-4.05)  
  
Leadership = Outsider 
  
-0.853*** 
(-4.34)  
  
Pure Type: Exploration = 
 (Decentralized + Insider)   
0.554*** 
(3.24) 
1.721*** 
(6.26) 
 
Mixed Type: (Decent + Outsider) 
    
1.211*** 
(3.19) 
-0.509# 
(-1.54) 
Mixed Type: (Cent + Insider) 
    
1.156*** 
(4.59) 
-0.565*** 
(-3.22) 
 Pure Type: Exploitation = 
 (Centralized + Outsider)   
-1.160*** 
(-4.65) 
 -1.721*** 
(-6.26) 
Industry and Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 373 373 373 373 373 
df 28 32 32 34 34 
Model x2 48.8** 76.7*** 78.1*** 78.6*** 78.6*** 
change in df --- 4 4 6 6 
Change in Model x2 --- 27.9*** 29.3*** 29.8*** 29.8*** 
Pseudo R2 3.8% 6.0% 6.1% 6.2% 6.2% 
VWLS R2 9.9% 12.7% 14.1% 13.9% 13.9% 
 
Legend: # p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 All one-sided tests 
